


MEMORANDUM FOR:

Dish
Mr. Lehman

I found these comments on the
National Intelligence (Task Force)
Situation Report while pruning some
of Cord Meyer's old files. FYI and
destroy.


Chief, Requirements & Evaluation Staff

Date 9 June 1978

FORM 101 USE PREVIOUS
5-75 EDITIONS

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B01027R000200080006-2

Next 10 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B01027R000200080006-2

CONFIDENTIAL

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

Intelligence Community Staff

IC 76-2371
24 August 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Major General Lincoln D. Faurer, USAF
Vice Director for Production
Defense Intelligence Agency

FROM:

Production Assessment and Improvement
Division

SUBJECT: Comments on Operations of National Task
Force During Korean Crisis, 19-23
August 1976

The following is a list of preliminary observations and some suggestions requested by your staff for a wrapup report being prepared:

a. Operational Data. The flow of operational information was not made available to the task force on a regular basis. Even though DIA had representatives on the Crisis Action Team in the NMCC, the flow of operational data was still sporadic and incomplete. It is also our understanding that military reps in the State Operations Center were receiving operational data from the NMCC for use in preparing State Sitreps. (CIA, in fact, got better operational information than the Task Force.)

b. Participation by Department of State. Little information was received from State and that only by request. A State Sitrep of 1800 hours on 20 August was not forwarded to the task force until requested by the team chief via telephone. No EXDIS/LIMDIS/NODIS cables

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

were received from State until the crisis was really over. State provided no personnel support to the task force. (Any agency not participating in the Sitrep Task Force should be assumed to concur in the Sitrep.)

c. Analytic Support. Generally, the intelligence and collection support to the task force was adequate. Especially noteworthy was the high quality of the analysts provided by each agency. They assured what could have been a grim situation turned out to be an effective operation.

d. Physical Location of Task Force. The actual facilities for the task force were less than adequate. DIA's Korean Task Force appeared to have better facilities, e.g., access to message traffic, TV monitors for relevant briefings, OB displays, etc. The national task force had to employ "runners" to insure that all appropriate message traffic was being received. A task force, if it truly is to be "national," needs a higher profile than this--perhaps located in the NMCC area. This might also improve the J-2/J-3 interface problem.

e. Task Force Log. A more precise and detailed log would be helpful, especially in reconstructing the events of a crisis. Although not so important for this crisis, exact times of information received, important phone calls, additional instructions, etc. can be very valuable for post-mortem reports.

f. Utility. The substantive quality of the national Sitreps has been excellent, especially the assessment section.



25X1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Distribution:

Original - Addressee

- 1 -
- 1 -
- 1 - IC Registry
- 1 -
- 1 - PAID Subject
- 1 - PAID Chrono

DCI/IC/PAID/ (8/24/76)

S E C R E T

26 August 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: NIO Views on the Korean Crisis

X1 On 25 August, [] NIO for Japan/Pacific, met with Cord
X1 Meyer and me to discuss intelligence activities in the recent Korean
crisis. [] described the sequence of events and her impres-
sions:

- The first WSAG meeting (4:00 p.m., Wednesday, 18 August) re-
sulted in SECSTATE instructing Philip Habib to set up an operational
task force in the State Department Operations Center. Arthur Hummel
(Asst. Sec. for East Asia) was named Task Force Chief. The TF had
representatives from OSD/ISA, JCS, State Legal Advisor, State Public
Affairs Office, the State Korean Desk Director, and either an NIO or
a DDO representative. The TF kept track of and supervised U.S. ac-
tions decided on in WSAG, and produced a periodic SITREP on U.S. ac-
tions. This SITREP contained some intelligence information. Colbert
believed that less intelligence information reporting would have been
duplicated if the National Intelligence SITREP had been produced on a
schedule that would have permitted it to be appended to the State
SITREP. There was little need for CIA to keep expert analysts in
this TF on a 24-hour basis since the TF was primarily concerned with
policy implementation and attendance there kept analysts away from
their desks performing analysis and preparing reports and briefings.
CIA representation in such a TF is needed, however, to keep track
of events and would be essential if CIA operations were involved.

- The DCI called for a National Intelligence SITREP and, on Adm.
Murphy's advise, designated DIA as Executive Agent for its produc-
tion. Thus, another task force was set up and CIA analysts were de-
tailed to participate. Physical facilities were lacking in DIA and
there was initial confusion because it was not clear whether the TF
members were to draft the SITREP or seek contributions. [] did
not know who received this SITREP or what impact it had.

25X1

S E C R E T

25X1

S E C R E T

X1 - At the direction of the DDCI, a CIA Task Force was also set up, headed by [] from OCI. OCI and OSR contributed expertise to this TF. It was not clear to Colbert why CIA set up this TF as CIA had provided participants in the State and DIA task forces. [] noted that, because the DDI is functionally organized, it has difficulty in providing officers who can cover the full range of substantive problems arising in crises. 25X1

X1 - There was an adverse reaction from DOD and Adm. Murphy, when OSR, at [] request, prepared a study on North Korean capabilities to respond to various types of U.S. actions. This report, intended to help the Chairman of the JCS in coping with the possible consequences of various U.S. options, was perceived as an unwanted CIA effort to prescribe U.S. response options. The Director was unsuccessful in correcting this misunderstanding.

- Several lessons were learned from these events:

1. While it is useful to have representation in task forces that implement and consider U.S. options, care needs to be taken that the Community does not dissipate its limited analytic resources on participation in meetings, task forces, etc., at the expense of performing needed analysis and reporting tasks. The Community will need, however, to plan for participation in WSAG working groups.

2. The provisions and procedures for a Community task force to produce a National Intelligence Situation Report should be planned for and the need to implement this carefully considered to minimize unnecessary disruption of existing mechanisms.

3. There is a need to have a better understanding with State and DOD officials on the role, contribution, and relationship of intelligence to planning and decision-making.

4. The role of the NIO and the DDI, in particular, need to be carefully considered in crisis planning to make maximum use of existing relationships, procedures and capabilities with a minimum of disruption during a crisis.

- 2 -

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

5. Greater care needs to be taken to alert senior officials on incipient crises.



25X1

- 3 -

S E C R E T

CONFIDENTIAL

27 August 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Current Intelligence

FROM :

:

SUBJECT

:

The Korea Task Force of 19-20 August

25X1

Mission

1. With military alerts on both sides of the Korean DMZ following the murder of two American officers on 17 August, the Korea Task Force was given the general mission of concentrating the assets of the agency to be ready as needed. It was specifically admonished, however, not to write and disseminate a situation report under its own name--this being the responsibility of the National Sitrep Task Force in the Department of Defense.

2. The task force nevertheless prepared itself to provide written and oral briefings by the afternoon of 19 August. Each eight-hour shift produced an in-house situation report which was made available to the Operations Center senior duty officer, as background for CIA personnel assigned to the task force in the Department of Defense, and as a contribution to the National Intelligence Situation Report. These informal sitreps were also made available to a few agency personnel who requested briefings on developments in Korea.

3. This production helped exercise the analysts and established a record of events and nonevents. It also helped prepare task force officers to brief senior agency visitors on short or no notice.

4. The task force also coordinated some work on the Korea problem produced by other offices in the agency, and it maintained liaison communications with the Department of State task force and the Department of Defense task force.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Core of the Task Force

5. The main core of the task force consisted of four three-shift rosters of personnel from OCI and OSR. The four rosters kept a round-the-clock watch on Korean military developments, Korean political developments, and on possible Soviet and Chinese reactions to Korea-related developments. It was necessary to find officers who knew the territory and have them assigned to the task force without seriously damaging the work of the contributing offices. In assembling the task force, an attempt was made to avoid excessive staffing while assuring that the force on hand would be adequate to work on a really serious crisis should one develop. The limited supply of Korean talent was stretched thin. When the shift chief on duty was well versed in Korean affairs, it was possible to use analysts with less background. From the outset, shift hours were set to permit each officer to remain in good health while working under heavy pressure through an extended period, if necessary.

6. In addition to the four rosters from OCI and OSR, a three-shift roster was provided by the [redacted] 25X

[redacted] The functions and purpose of the SOG team were not clear to other members of the task force, including experienced support personnel. A subsequent interview indicates that the SOG personnel who appeared also had a very vague idea of what their function should be, and they decided on their own initiative to make an Order of Battle map and to make available other military background information--this being a field in which they specialize in their own Special Operations Information Center. The motivation of all concerned was good, and after [redacted] OSR personnel were introduced to each other a good rapport developed. [redacted] 25X
[redacted] did produce a good order of battle briefing board, which was badly needed by the task force early on. It remains unclear, however, whether the special talents [redacted] were truly germane to the mission of the task force. It would appear that task force needs for military information could have been met by the OSR team alone. [redacted] 25X
[redacted] team needs further clarification. [redacted] statement of its activities with the task force is attached.) 25X

Support

7. The task force chief was most importantly assisted by his able branch secretary, who works well in flap situations. Both the senior duty officer provided by the Operations Center and the DDS&T psychologist assigned to observe crisis management in the Task Force Center were extremely

CONFIDENTIAL

valuable sources of advice for the task force. The support of such assistants makes a great deal of difference to the new task force chief, particularly during the first hours of the group's constitution and operation.

8. In addition to the round-the-clock teams, contributions from many offices in the DDI assisted the task force. The Intelligence Analysis Staff sent a small team with a variety of briefing boards showing North Korean order of battle and selected military positions. Task force analysts were in communication with their FBIS counterparts. On its own initiative, OER prepared a paper on North Korean sea and air transportation. Cartography worked long and hard on a variety of briefing aids, some which in the final event were not used by the task force but which are being held in case of future need.

9. Round-the-clock liaison teams were staffed at State by DDO's EA Division and in the NMIC by officers from OPR, IAS, and OSR. DDO officers traditionally have served in liaison capacity for the agency at the State Department on policy matters. In view of the competing demands for DDI people familiar with Korea to work on the agency task force and at the Department of Defense, the offer by the DDO to take care of the liaison staffing problem at the State policy task force was particularly welcome. The arrangement seemed to work very well.

10. Cooperation from all agency offices was very good.

Facilities

11. The space provided by the Task Force Center was adequate for the work of the Korea Task Force, but it would not be adequate if a national intelligence task force should be constituted in the center. There would not be enough space to accommodate liaison officers sent from DIA, NSA and State.

12. The separate office provided the task force chief, which also served as a briefing room for senior agency officers, is extremely important for the effective functioning of the task force. In the confusion that inevitably attends the constitution of the new task force, the availability of a separate room allows the chief to determine his priorities, delegate tasks to others, and monitor the work

CONFIDENTIAL

with some protection from the constant tugs and pulls of the main work room.

Senior Officers Present

13. The interest shown by the DCI, the D/DCI/IC, and other senior CIA officers in the crisis occasioned special opportunities and problems for the task force. Visits by senior officers of course facilitated task force briefings for those same officers. These senior officers also stood ready to assist in the task force's work, manned telephones during the critical period, and helped acquire information not readily available from the Department of Defense.

14. The presence of senior officers sometimes in large numbers can occasionally distract analysts engaged in digesting reports and preparing written and oral briefings. To provide orderly briefings in an appropriate atmosphere, briefing facilities were maintained in the separate room. The Deputy Division Chief of EAPD/OCI assisted the shift chief by keeping himself available to work with the visitors and to see that they were briefed as appropriate.

15. Had the cutting of the tree at Panmunjom been followed by really serious developments, the presence of the large number of agency officers not directly engaged in the task force work or being supported by it would have made it difficult for the task force to do its work.

Coordination Problems

16. As perceived from the vantage point of the Korea Task Force, activity by the National Sitrep Task Force at the NMIC began rather slowly. The agency liaison representative suspected that the NSTF would have difficulty meeting its deadlines in the early hours of 20 August and issued a call for help. The evening shift of the Korea Task Force sent its own in-house situation report to the liaison officer who made it available for the use of the NSTF, and much of it was incorporated into the first National Intelligence Situation Report published. A draft of this Sitrep was received by the Korea Task Force and coordination was effected. The following afternoon additional material was sent to the agency

CONFIDENTIAL

representative at the NSTF. The leadership of that task force, however, apparently then forgot that national intelligence by definition must be coordinated, and no draft of the second NISR was provided to the Korea Task Force for coordination purposes. This lapse suggests that some further education is needed in the community on the need for coordination in the production of national intelligence.

17. It should also be noted that, although the Department of State sent a representative to the organizational meeting of the NSTF, it did not maintain a liaison officer at that task force. As far as we know, State did not participate in that task force's work or coordinate its product.

18. As is frequently the case when US operations become an important part of the picture, the intelligence arm of the government was often kept in the dark about US operational intentions. Requests even from highest levels of the agency could not shake loose important operational traffic--some of which was sent by the Department of Defense to State but not to CIA.

19. A request was made for Department of Defense photographs of the 17 August incident for the DCI, but the photos were never provided. Interagency parochialism clearly continues to impede the national intelligence effort.

Recommendations

20. The crowd-control problem in the task force center requires the retention of the separate room now provided for the task force chief's use and for briefing.

21. It would be extremely helpful to station a receptionist at the entrance of the Task Force Center to screen out bystanders, badge appropriate visitors, and direct telephone calls to the officers working in the task force.

22. The task force chief needs an intercom facility to talk to officers in the main workroom without being forced to leave his desk.

23. All OCI personnel should be given a tour of the Task Force Center and briefed on the real functions, formal and informal, of intelligence task forces as they are organized in the Washington community today.

CONFIDENTIAL

24. Personnel who might be sent as liaison officers to task forces in the DOD and State should be identified and given tours of those facilities now. They should also be briefed on the opportunities and problems encountered by liaison officers who have served with past task forces.





Enclosure: a/s



25X1

Distribution:

Orig. - Addressee

1 - 
1 - 
1 - 
1 - 
1 - Chief, EAPD/OCI

CONFIDENTIAL

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM					
UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET	
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP					
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS		DATE	INITIALS	
1	[Redacted] Rm 6G11			25X	
2					
3					
4					
5					
6					
ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY	
APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION	
COMMENT		FILE		RETURN	
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE	
Remarks: Trust this will be helpful. Please do not hesitate to call if I can be of further assistance - on this project or others.					
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER					
FROM NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.				DATE	
[Redacted]				25X 24-AUG-75	
				SECRET	

FORM NO.
1-67

237

Use previous editions

(40)

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B01027R000200080006-2

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt


Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B01027R000200080006-2

SECRET

2 September 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT : National Intelligence Situation Report on Korea--
Comments by the Senior CIA Participant



Facts

The first interagency task force to produce a "national intelligence situation report" was set in motion on Thursday morning, 19 August by the Director of Central Intelligence. The task force, managed by Major General Lincoln D. Faurer (Vice Director for Production, DIA) issued eight "sitreps"--at:

0200 EDT	20 August	1200 EDT	24 August
1400 EDT	20 August	0900 EDT	25 August
2400 EDT	20 August	1000 EDT	26 August
0500 EDT	23 August	1200 EDT	27 August

Task force activity was suspended at noon, Friday, 27 August.

Task force members (and other interested parties) first assembled at the Pentagon's National Military Intelligence Center at about 1300 Thursday, 19 August. At 1500, DIA (as the DCI's "Executive Agent") chaired a free-wheeling organizational meeting of representatives from CIA, NSA, State/INR, and DIA--with observers from the IC Staff and from a number of DOD components. It was decided that the task force would commence a 24-hour operation without delay and, at Lt. General Wilson's instruction, prepare a "base-line" sitrep for distribution very early the following morning. At the meeting, which lasted a few hours, the INR representative announced that INR, short of qualified

SECRET

SECRET

analysts, could not participate further in the exercise. Thereafter, INR had no role in the production or (to my knowledge) coordination of the sitreps. Nor did INR respond on the one occasion (on 27 August) when the task force made a specific request.

A major portion of the organizational session was devoted to varying degrees of assurance from high-level military officers--including General Wilson and Rear Admiral Robertson, DDI (NMIC)--that the task force would have a reasonably complete flow of information on Korea-related US military plans and operations. It was emphasized, however, that material on plans or "options" could not be placed in the sitreps.

Hour-to-hour management of the task force was in the hands of two alternating members of General Faurer's staff. Routinely, action at the assigned NMIC office picked up about four or five hours prior to publication--reviewing the mail, phone calls to parent agencies, preparation of drafts. Generally, the DIA specialist on Korea collaborated with his NSA counterpart on the military input, while the CIA specialist prepared political and international portions of the sitrep. (All this in contrast to the earlier assumption by DIA's task force managers that members would act mainly as funnels for drafts provided by parent organizations.) A paragraph or so on US military actions ongoing in the Korean area was put together by the DIA manager after conference with operational elements. Task force drafts were not much changed by higher military authority; nor was the required coordination of text with parent agencies any problem.

Comments

Quality. The Korea sitreps are "fair to good." Allowing for the newness of the interagency process, the product reflects credit on the DIA managers. There are (to my knowledge) no important mistakes of fact or significant omissions in the eight reports. There is one "assessment," in the third sitrep, that the task force would like to buy back.

Process. The strong points of the operation:

- 1 - While only four or five specialists were made available to the task force, they were able to carry 95 percent

-2-

SECRET

SECRET

of the production burden over the week. Each proved knowledgeable on Korea and capable of writing well. Mutual trust and easy teamwork prevailed within 36 hours of beginning operations.

- 2 - Support from parent agencies (DIA, NSA, CIA) and their respective task forces--each agency (and State) had one, at least until Saturday the 21st--appeared to be excellent. The CIA task force on Korea responded well to my request for a written contribution to the initial sitrep, and to my frequent phone calls for information. On occasion, I visited the CIA Ops Center to review material not readily available at the Pentagon, especially maps and photos. OCI analysts and NID editors responded to my frequent calls on an individual basis after the CIA task force was disbanded. FBIS was very helpful; in the period of highest tension, FBIS maintained a 24-hour media watch on North Korea, China, and the USSR, and provided prompt reporting and analysis by telephone at the initiative of its staff.

Now for the bad news:

- 1 - The military failed to provide the promised flow of background information on US plans and operations. If the DCI gave the sitrep action to DIA in order to complete this (often lacking) piece of the intelligence puzzle, it didn't work! Indeed, at the moment of maximum tension--at 1800 EDT, Friday the 20th--the DCI's personal effort to secure details of the tree-cutting operation exposed the J-3 area's clear unwillingness to cut the intelligence community into the action. Persistent effort by CIA's representative at J-3 did not change this situation through the week. It should be noted too that CIA and NSA task force members had no unescorted access to the hyperactive NMCC area through the entire week.

-3-

SECRET

SECRET

- 2 - The operational information problem was compounded by the inability of the task force to secure the State Department task force's daily publication on Korean plans and activities (prepared perhaps in connection with WSAG discussions). The CIA task force received it. INR received it. The JCS received it. The task force managed to acquire one or two rather stale issuances.
- 3 - The flow of intelligence information for the task force was not managed well by DIA. Paper flow was sporadic; some pieces available to other agencies were totally absent or appeared late; non-coms in charge of the paper flow seemed generally unaware of task force needs, or even of its existence.
- 4 - The paper flow problem was part of a generally poor physical setup provided by DIA. Room and desk space were at a premium in the Pentagon basement area. Phones were inadequate at some points--e.g., only one gray line. Secretarial help and general clerical assistance were not always available. Some personnel handling Xerox and LDX work seemed indifferent to task force requests for speed.
- 5 - Maps, photos, and other graphics were sparse, totally inadequate to task force needs.
- 6 - Other "housekeeping" problems included the usual complaints of slow "badging" of task force personnel, our inability to enter the Pentagon at night without escort, lack of food and beverages over long night shifts, and parking problems. The same problems would probably be encountered at McLean.
- 7 - Finally, all task force members agree that there was no substantive need for sitreps after Monday morning, the 23rd; the task force should have been terminated at that time.

-4-

SECRET

SECRET

Recommendations


The national intelligence sitrep system adds another to the long list of task forces which emerge in crisis situations. At the Pentagon last week, there was a DIA task group, a Crisis Action Team, the usual NMCC mechanisms--and our own task force. The competition for military information was lost by the National Intelligence Situation Report Task Force. Intelligence, in my view, will always lose to operational support in the Pentagon. Perhaps the DCI should review the idea of casting DIA as "Executive Agent" for future sitreps.

JCS unwillingness to provide information to intelligence operators in time of crisis is an old story. I despair of "solutions."

The new sitrep system adds another element of competition to the usual interagency struggle for area specialist personnel in time of crisis. In this case, two of the three CIA bodies provided the task force were not up to the mark on Korean affairs.

"National" intelligence sitreps could reasonably be expected to reflect awareness of all important aspects of a developing situation; the name certainly conveys such an impression. The interagency task force, lacking information on planned US military moves and lacking information (from State) on evolving US political strategies (e.g., our posture at upcoming Panmunjom sessions, results of private Chinese contacts), could not properly sharpen its focus on North Korean actions and statements in preparing certain of the sitreps. For a truly "national" intelligence product, for a report that takes account of the "real world," the customary DOD and State barriers would have to be lowered, at least for task force participants.

25X1


CIA Representative on the
National Intelligence Sitrep Task Force

-5-

SECRET